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ABSTRACT 
The effects of increasing import competition on output displacement and exit of 
heterogeneousdomestic firms are investigated within the context of an oligopolistic 
rivalry model.The displacement effect is found to be stronger for large "output 
flexible" firms, while small"cost flexible" ones are less affected by increasing import 
pressure. Extending the model to allow for product heterogeneity between domestic 
and foreign firms, we also find that product differentiation lowers the displacement 
effect. The theoretical findings are supported at the empirical level by the analysis of 
firm exit dynamics for 12 manufacturing sectors in 8 European countries, from 1997 
to 2003. In particular, we find that the exit of large firms is sensitive to the shock of 
increasing import penetration from low-wage countries. Small firms in the same 
industries are instead only affected by marginal trade integration with respect to 
neighbouring EU countries and other relatively wealthy trading partners. Hence this 
paper shows, for the first time, that firms of different size might be affected 
differently by diverse sources of import competition. Implications on firms’ strategic 
planning and public policy are discussed. 
 
JEL classification: F12, F14, L11, L25, L60 
Keywords: oligopolistic competition, low-wage country import competition, firm exit 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
During the last fifteen years, the world economy has been undergoing a 
pervasive globalisation process, characterised by increasing labour, capital and 
product markets integration. Within this general change, the observed dramatic boost 
in international trade between rich Western countries and low-wage economies is one 
of the most controversial and debated phenomena. At this purpose, the figures are 
stark. Between 1990 and 2006, as the volume of global exports was almost tripling, 
the share accounted for by non-OECD countries has been growing from 25% to 33%. 
In particular, imports from low-wage economies have been the fastest growing 
component of total manufacturing imports for both the EU and the US. This pattern 
configures itself as a deep structural change, which implies an increase in the 
competitive pressure on domestic firms in Western countries. Indeed, consistent with 
policy concerns, Bernard et al. (2006) and Coucke and Sleuwaegen (forthcoming) 
have found that increasing import competition from low-wage countries is associated 
to higher firm exit for the United States and Belgium respectively, with labour 
intensive firms being relatively more affected. The literature has identified different 
strategic channels of firm-level reaction to such global threats. First of all, cost 
reductions and efficiency gains are of crucial importance when competing with 
foreign firms based in low-wage countries. In addiction to this, firms have been 
shown to respond to the higher competitive pressure by changing their product-mix 
towards niche and more capital/skill intensive products, thus specializing in activities 
which are more consistent with their comparative advantages (Bernard et al., 2006; 
Coucke and Sleuwaegen, forthcoming).  
Finally, international sourcing of intermediate goods and services, through de-
localization of production or arms length trade, has been found to increase the 
likelihood of survival for manufacturing firms (Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 
forthcoming). Overall, firm heterogeneity seems to matter decisively in determining 
the way in which companies are affected by deepening trade integration (Bernard et 
al., forthcoming; Tybout 2003). This is consistent with the recent developments of 
international trade theory: Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) in the first place. 
And yet, there is one important dimension of heterogeneity whose implications in this 
context have not been explored so far: firm size. The present paper aims at filling this 
literature gap. Indeed, we analyse the relative competitive position of small and bigger 
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firms within the same industry, following trade liberalisation with respect to low-
wage countries.  
The addressed issue is extremely relevant from a policy perspective, as 
companies of different size might require a diverse policy approach in the adjustment 
phase. 
We start our analysis by developing an asymmetric oligopoly model of 
international competition, in which domestic and foreign firms compete in quantities. 
In this framework, the effects of trade liberalisation are then studied through a 
comparative statics exercise. The model predicts 2 that domestic firms shrink and 
loose profits due to increased import competition. However, small “cost flexible” 
firms are relatively less affected by the trade shock than large “output flexible” ones. 
Indeed, the latter face a stronger reduction in output and profits, which in turn implies 
lower probabilities of survival, as they might no longer be able to cover their high 
level of fixed costs. The latter predictions hold also when allowing for product 
differentiation between domestic and foreign firms. Moreover, we find that higher 
levels of product heterogeneity shelter domestic producers from the import 
displacement effect. In the second part of the paper, the theoretical findings are tested 
at the empirical level by using sectoral exit data for twelve manufacturing industries 
in eight European countries, for the time span 1997-2003. Consistent with the model, 
we find that large domestic firms are affected by the shock of increasing import 
competition from low-wage countries in terms of higher death rates. Exit of small 
firms (with less than 20 employees) is instead only enhanced by marginal increases in 
trade integration with respect to neighbouring European countries or other relatively 
wealthy trading partners. Finally, increasing levels of intra-industry trade, pointing to 
higher product differentiation with respect to the trading partners, are associated to 
lower exit, but only for small producers. These results convey the idea that small 
firms, thanks to their cost flexibility and product differentiation, find themselves in a 
relatively favourable competitive position when faced with a structural shock such as 
the fast increase in import penetration from low-wage countries. The remaining of the 
paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical model and 
analyse the comparative statics results. In section 3, data and empirical model are 
presented. Results are discussed in section 4, while section 5 concludes. 
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2 THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
In this section we develop a Cournot-type oligopoly model of international 
competition, in the spirit of Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983). We 
first analyse a quantitycompeting asymmetric oligopoly with two representative firms, 
a domestic and a foreign one, producing the same homogeneous good. Then, we 
extend the model by allowing for product differentiation. 
The domestic firm produces in country A, and its cost function is denoted by 
)( dd qC (we assume 0, ''' >dd CC ). It competes on the domestic market (country A) 
with a foreign producer (country B), which is assumed to be able to provide any 
quantity of the homogeneous good at a constant marginal cost τ, inclusive of tariffs 
and transport costs. Increasing openness to imports is thus modeled in this framework 
as a decline in τ . Hence, we can exploit the model 3 to investigate, through 
comparative statics, the effects of the recent trend of import penetration from low-
wage economies on domestic firms in developed countries. 
 
The inverse demand function in country A is given by: 
)( df qqP +−= βα       (1) 
with α, β > 0, where index f  refers to the foreign firm, while d  points to the 
domestic one. 
Each firm solves a profit maximization problem as follows: 
 
)([),,(max dfdfdq qqqqd +−= βατpi ] )( ddd qCq −     (2) 
)([),,(max dfdffq qqqqf +−= βατpi ] ),( τfff qCq −    (3) 
 
By studying the effects of a reduction in τ (e.g. decreasing tariff) we can prove 
the following: 
Proposition 1: The domestic firm shrinks in terms of output and loses profits 
following a decrease in τ . The displacement effect of increased import penetration is 
stronger for a large output flexible firm than for a small cost flexible one. 
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Proof: By totally differentiating the first order conditions, and applying 
Cramer’s rule, we obtain the following expressions (full derivation is given in the 
Annex): 
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From equations 4 and 5 we can see that the domestic firm reduces its level of 
output and loses profits following a decrease in τ . This "diplacement effect" is 
crucially determined by the second order derivative of the cost function, and hence by 
the output flexibility of the domestic firm. 
The concept of output flexibility goes back to Stigler (1939) and Marschak 
and Nelson (1962), and is related to the slope of the marginal cost curve. A firm is 
denoted as output flexible if 4 changes in output are associated with small cost 
changes, i.e. the marginal cost curve is flat, resulting in a small second order 
derivative of the cost function. Thus, our model predicts that the displacement effect 
is going to be directly related to the level of output flexibility of the domestic firm. 
Indeed, as already noted by Stigler (1939), output flexibility is not a free good, being 
it associated to cost inflexibility. In manufacturing, for instance, output flexible firms 
are typically large entities characterized by a high level of fixed costs and low 
variable costs. Their inability to reduce production costs in a flexible way constitutes 
a disadvantage in reacting to the trade shock. Large firms are thus predicted to be 
harmed by increasing import pressure to a greater extent, in terms of output and 
profits. As a result, they are also more likely to exit, as they might be unable to cover 
their higher level of fixed costs, and do the necessary capital investments. In a 
different context, Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) also showed that smaller firms 
outlast their larger competitors in a declining industry.  
Our results are also consistent with those of Weiss (1999), who concluded that 
the attractiveness of output flexibility decreases with growing competition and 
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decreasing market power. Output flexibility constitutes a strategic advantage in 
quickly growing markets with high entry barriers. However, under rising global 
competition, being output flexible becomes rather a disadvantage. 
We now extend our framework by allowing for product differentiation 
between the output of the domestic and the foreign firm. We do so in a similar way as 
in Martin (2001). 
Equation 6 and 7 represent the new inverse demand curves for the domestic 
and the foreign firm respectively: 
 
)( dfd qqP +−= ϑβα  (6) 
)( dff qqP ϑβα +−=  (7) 
with α , β  > 0. 
ϑ  is a parameter for product differentiation, ranging between zero and one. 
Decreasing values of the parameter are associated to increasing product 
differentiation. If ϑ  = 1 we are back in the simple case with homogeneous products. 
 
In this extended set-up of the model, we can prove: 
 
Proposition 2: Ceteris paribus, following a decrease inτ , higher levels of 
product differentiation (lowerυ ) are associated to a lower displacement effect on the 
domestic firm’s output and profits. 
 
Proof : Solving the model, and repeating the same comparative statics analysis 
as before, we obtain the following results (see Annex): 
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Equations 8 and 9 confirm the previous finding that the domestic firm shrinks 
in terms of output and loses profits following a decrease inτ . However, the 
displacement effect decreases with the level of product heterogeneity. In particular, 
the effect approaches zero as ϑ  → 0, i.e. if there is complete differentiation between 
the domestic and foreign firm’s products. Specularly, if ϑ  = 1 we are back in the 
previous case with homogeneous products. 
Finally, also in the extended model the displacement effect is inversely related 
to the second order derivative of the domestic firm’s cost function. Hence, both 
product differentiation and cost flexibility are predicted to reduce the displacement 
effect from increased import pressure. In the remaining of the paper we assess these 
theoretical findings through an econometric analysis, by focusing on the implications 
for firm exit at the industry level. 
 
3 DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
3.1 Data description and definitions 
Our empirical analysis is based on firm exit data from the Eurostat "Business 
Demography Statistics” database. In particular, we employ sectoral exit rates for eight 
European countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. We focus on the manufacturing sector, for the time-span: 
1997-2003. Data are provided at the Eurostat NACE (Rev. 1.1) “sub-section” level of 
industry aggregation1. Sub-sections are identified by two-character alphabetical codes 
(from DA to DN) and correspond to two-digit sectors or aggregations of them (see 
Table 1)2. 
 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
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Exit rates in a given country, industry and year are defined as the ratio of 
exiting firms over the number of active ones. For each sector-country pair (and year) 
we could retrieve two separate figures, referring to the population of small (with less 
than 20 employees) and larger firms (with 20 employees or more). Data are 
comparable across countries and are constructed in order to identify “true” exits of 
firms. Indeed, as reported by Eurostat, firm exit figures reflect only real dissolution of 
enterprises. In practice, this is obtained by processing the full national business 
registers’ data in order to identify and exclude those exits which are just due to 
mergers and take-overs. Changes of activities at the firm level are also not registered 
as exits from a given sector. Moreover, a company is excluded from the count of 
deaths if it gets reactivated within two years, which explains the time-lag in the data 
release3. 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics referring to country-specific exit 
rates, on average over the time span, for the whole manufacturing sector. The cross-
country mean exit rate is 6.3%, with figures ranging from 4.8% in Sweden up to 9.8% 
in the UK. As one would expect, small firms’ exit rates are much higher than their 
equivalents referring to the population of larger firms: 7.1% vs. 1% on average. In 
Table 3 the evolution of exit rates over time is displayed, on average across countries. 
The figures depict a pattern of increasing death rates for both categories of firms. In 
particular, large firms’ exit rates witness a three-fold increase between 1997 and 2003, 
moving from 0.4% to 1.3%. 
Insert Table 2 and 3 About Here 
In the empirical analysis presented in the next sections we study the 
relationship between exit dynamics and the evolution of trade exposure. At this 
purpose, we employ international trade data retrieved from the Eurostat COMEXT 
Database, from 1995 to 2003. As a first step, we proxy the extent of import pressure 
through a volume-based index, as in Davis et al.(1996). In particular, for each 
industry we compute the overall level of import competition as the following ratio: 
sectoral imports over the sum of domestic production and imports4.  
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Figure 1 shows the evolution of this index at the country level, for the whole 
manufacturing sector, from 1995 to 2003. As it can be seen, import pressure is 
increasing in all the considered countries. 
The index moves from an average value of 0.29 to 0.33, with the highest 
increases witnessed by Belgium (from 0.40 to 0.49) and the Netherlands (from 0.39 to 
0.45). 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
This preliminary analysis confirms the general idea that manufacturing firms 
in the European Union have been facing increasing competition from foreign 
producers on the domestic markets. However, the general import competition index 
does not say anything about “where” the increased import pressure is coming from. 
Thus, given the focus of our analysis, we have further decomposed the import 
competition index into two components: one representing import penetration from 
low-wage countries (impcomp-low) and the other referring to the remaining 7 trading 
partners (impcomp-high). This is done, as in Bernard et al. (2006), by keeping at the 
numerator the level of imports from the two sets of countries alternatively. At this 
purpose, Table 4 shows the list of the 52 low-wage trading partners. It is the same as 
in Bernard et al. (2006), and includes China, India and other economies with a level of 
GDP per-capita lower than 5% of the US figure. 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
As previously anticipated, import flows from these low-wage trading partners 
have almost quintuplicated between 1995 and 2003, and their share of total imports 
has doubled, moving from 4% to 8%, on average across the considered EU countries 
and sectors. In particular, in 2003 low-wage countries accounted for 30% and 22% 
respectively of total imports of leather and textile products, with these shares rising up 
to 44% in the Netherlands and 28% in the UK.  
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Apart from the latter labour intensive sectors, import penetration from 
relatively poor countries has been increasing substantially also in other industries, like 
electrical and optical equipment, non-metallic mineral products, wood, plastic and 
rubber products, machinery and equipment (see Table 5). As a result, when 
considering the dynamics of the two import competition indexes described above, we 
find that “impcomp-low” has more than doubled over the time period: from 0.016 in 
1995 to 0.035 in 2003 (on average across countries and sectors). At the same time 
“impcomp-high”, although larger in magnitude, has grown only marginally: from 0.3 
to 0.32. Thus, the increase in import competition from low-wage countries configures 
itself as “the” trade shock for manufacturing firms over the considered period. In the 
empirical analysis, while controlling for the overall dynamics of trade, we will focus 
in particular on the differential effects of imports from low-wage countries on firms of 
different size. 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
Finally, one of the predictions of the theoretical model concerns the extent of 
product differentiation between domestic and foreign firms. At the empirical level, 
this is proxied through the Grubel-Lloyd (1975) index of intra-industry trade, which is 
computed as follows (Coucke and Sleuwaegen, forthcoming): 
 
ijtIIT = 2 * 
ijtijt
ijtijt
XM
XM
+
),min(
 (10) 
  
where ijtM  and ijtX  represent, respectively, import and export flows for sector 
i in country j at time t.  
ijtIIT  ranges between zero and one. Increasing values of the index represent 
higher levels of intra-industry trade, which point to growing product differentiation 
between domestic and foreign producers within the same sector (Caves, 1981). For 
instance, following trade liberalisation, IIT  might grow because domestic firms 
specialize in the production of more capital/skill intensive goods and other niche 
products, as showed by Bernard et al. (2006) for the US manufacturing. 
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3.2 The empirical model 
In this section we present the analytical framework which will be used in order 
to assess the predictions of our theoretical model. The empirical approach is similar to 
the one followed by Bernard et al. (2006) and Colantone and Sleuwaegen (2007). In 
particular, the latter authors have shown, using the same Eurostat data described 
above, that an increase in import competition raises firm exit at the sector level. 
However, in our analysis we go deeper by investigating, for the first time, the impact 
of import penetration from different sources on firms of different size. We do so 
through fixed effects panel data econometric regressions, which allow to control for 
heterogeneity across sectors and countries. 
The baseline estimating equation looks as follows: 
 
10 ββ +=ijtExit )1(2)1( __ −− ∆+∆ tijtij highimpcomplowimpcomp β  (11) 
ijttjitijijt ZIIT εβββββ +++++∆+ − )1(43  
 
ijtExit , the dependent variable, is the exit rate for sector i in country j at time 
t . As previously anticipated, we alternatively employ exit rates referring to the 
population of small (< 20 employees) and larger (≥ 20 employees) firms within the 
same industry/country observational unit. 
)1(_ −∆ tijlowimpcomp  represents the change in the index of import competition 
from low-wage countries between 1−t and 2−t , computed as explained in the 
previous section. This variable is crucial in the empirical test. However, we also need 
to control for the evolution of import competition with respect to all the remaining 
trading partners. This is done by including in the set of regressors 
)1(_ −∆ tijhighimpcomp , which stands for the change in import competition from 
relatively wealthy countries. 
ijtIIT∆  is the change in the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade between 
t  and 1−t . 
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As explained in the previous Section, a positive variation in this indicator 
points to increasing product differentiation between domestic and foreign firms within 
the same sector. Thus, a negative association of this variable with sectoral exit would 
provide evidence in favour of the theoretical result that product heterogeneity shelters 
domestic producers from foreign competition. 
ji ββ ,  and tβ represent industry, country and year fixed effects. They are 
included in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity and time trends. This 
allows us to focus on the short-run effects of changes in trade, while conditioning for 
structural characteristics and long-run trends of specific industries and countries, 
together with cyclical effects. However, we still need to control for other possible 
sources of short-run turbulence. At this purpose, we include a vector )1( −tijZ  of 
industry (and country) specific explanatory variables, which have been identified in 
the literature as significant determinants of firm exit. They are described in what 
follows. 
First, many empirical studies have documented a positive correlation between 
firm exit in a period and previous entry in the same industry (Dunne et al., 1988; 
Siegfried and Evans, 1994; Mata and Portugal, 1994; De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 
2003). A theoretical interpretation for this finding is provided by the carrying capacity 
models (Carree and Thurik, 1999), where new firms may drive incumbents out of the 
market thanks to the introduction of better products and more efficient technologies. 
We take this into account by including as a regressor the lagged entry rate, computed 
as the ratio of entering firms over total active ones in each sector/country pair. 
Total factor productivity has also been identified as an important determinant 
of firm exit. Indeed, more productive firms tend to display higher survival 
probabilities (Bernard et al. 2006, 2006a; Coucke and Sleuwaegen, forthcoming). In 
our regressions we control for the lagged growth in TFP at the industry level; 
however, the expected effect of this variable on sectoral exit is not obvious, as it 
crucially depends on the underlying distribution of firm-level productivity changes 
within the industry. In fact, the same variation in sectoral TFP can be generated by 
very diverse firm-level dynamics, with different implications on exit. Data on total 
factor productivity have been retrieved from the EU KLEMS database (March 2007 
release), which has been produced by a consortium of fifteen organizations in the EU, 
supported by the European Commission, the OECD and various National Statistical 
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Institutes5. TFP is computed for each industry-country pair through a growth 
accounting exercise, by taking into account the output contribution of different 
categories of capital, labour, energy, materials and service inputs6. 
Finally, we include the logarithm of the lagged net investment in tangible 
assets over turnover at the industry level, computed starting from Eurostat Structural 
Business Statistics data. This variable constitutes a proxy for growth opportunities and 
the extent of restructuring undertaken in each sector, and reflects the evolution of 
industries through different stages of their products’ life cycles. Indeed, as shown by 
Klepper (1996) and Agarwal and Gort (1996), exit rates depend 10 systematically on 
the stage of market development in the cycle from birth to maturity. 
The model for small firms is estimated through standard Least Squares 
Dummy Variables regressions. For larger firms, instead, a Tobit estimation is 
performed, due to the presence of zero cells in the database (i.e. no exit observed in 
some industry/country/year). As shown by Greene (2004), the estimation of a Tobit 
model with fixed effects does not suffer from an incidental parameters problem, as far 
as the coefficients’ magnitude is concerned7. A bias arises instead in the estimation of 
variance and marginal effects. However, the latter bias is already lower than 1% when 
20 observations are available. Since we employ data for 8 countries, 12 sectors and 7 
years, our fixed effects are always identified over a high number of observations, 
which allows to be confident on the robustness of results8. Finally, heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are computed in both regressions. Results are presented in the 
next section. 
 
4 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 6 reports the outcome of the econometric analysis outlined above. 
Results referring to small and larger firms are reported in column 1 and 2, 
respectively. In the latter case, unconditional marginal effects from the Tobit 
estimation are reported. 
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Focusing on the trade-related variables, estimation results point to the same 
direction as our theoretical findings. Indeed, consistent with Proposition 1, we find 
that large (output flexible) firms’ exit is positively affected by the trade shock of 
increasing import pressure from low-wage countries, while the same does not hold 
true for small (cost flexible) firms. In particular, a marginal increase of 0.01 in the 
impcomp-low index generates higher exit rates of large firms by 0.4 percentage 
points, which represent about 40% of the average sectoral exit rate for this category of 
incumbents. Instead, exit rates of small firms are sensitive, to a lesser extent, to 
marginal increases in import competition from the set of relatively wealthy trading 
partners. In fact, a 0.01 increase in the impcomp-high index results in higher exit rates 
of small firms by 0.1 percentage points. Finally, in line with Proposition 2, an increase 
in intra-industry trade, pointing to higher product differentiation between domestic 
and foreign producers, is significantly associated to lower exit, but only for small 
firms. 
Concerning the other control variables, results from both regressions support 
the empirical regularity that exit is positively associated to previous entry. This 
provides additional evidence in favor of the "creative destruction" view by which new 
firms are expected to outcompete incumbents through the introduction of innovative 
products and/or production techniques (Carree and Thurik, 1999). Secondly, the exit 
of large firms is found to be positively related to lagged TFP growth, a finding not 
surprising given the industry level nature of our productivity measure, as already 
discussed. Finally, no significant effects on exit are detected with respect to the 
investment intensity at the industry level. 
Insert Table 6 About Here 
Overall, our results support the idea that small firms, thanks to their cost-
flexibility and product differentiation, enjoy a competitive advantage when faced with 
the shock of increasing import competition from low-wage countries. Indeed, we find 
that output flexible manufacturing firms, characterised by larger-scale activities, are 
sensitive to rising import pressure from poor countries. Instead, small cost flexible 
firms are only affected by the observed marginal deepening in trade integration with 
respect to European neighbours and other relatively wealthy countries. 
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Moreover, small producers are also found to exit relatively less when intra-
industry trade is increasing, which points to product differentiation as an effective 
strategy for reacting to soaring international competitive pressure. All these results are 
consistent with our theoretical findings, and with the view that output flexibility may 
turn out to be a disadvantage in a context of growing competition and decreasing 
market power (Weiss, 1999). 
Our findings, both at the theoretical and empirical level, reinforce the idea that 
opening to international trade increases the competitive pressure on domestic firms, 
thus resulting in higher exit rates. This view has been emerging from the new 
theoretical models of international trade allowing for firm heterogeneity (e.g. Melitz, 
2003; Bernard et al., 2003) and has been supported by a number of empirical studies, 
which have found the survival probabilities of domestic firms in Western countries to 
be reduced by increasing import competition, especially if the latter is driven by 
growing trade inflows from low-wage countries (Bernard et al., 2006; Coucke and 
Sleuwaegen, forthcoming; Greenaway et al., 2008). However, in this paper we add to 
the previous literature findings by showing, for the first time, that firms of different 
size might be affected differently by diverse sources of import competition. In 
particular, we find that large output flexible firms are more sensitive to the shock of 
increasing import competition from low-wage countries than their smaller 
counterparts. Failing to take this dimension of analysis into account might result in 
empirical findings which are biased by the composition of the firms’ sample. For 
instance, in a recent paper on Swedish firms, Greenaway et al. (2008) find that the 
probability of exit by closedown is increased the most by rising import competition 
from non-OECD countries rather than from other OECD members. Moreover, the 
effect of import competition is not found to vary across firms of different size. In the 
light of our findings, the latter results might be driven by the fact that the analysed 
sample includes only firms with more than 50 employees. Previous management 
studies have also put forward the view that firms of different size operate in distinct 
strategic groups within the same sector (Porter, 1973-1979; McGee and Thomas, 
1986). Our paper provides the first evidence that a size-based partition of industries 
might also apply with respect to international competition. Indeed, we have shown 
that large firms active in high-scale production display higher exit rates in response to 
increasing import competition from low-wage countries.  
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Firms of lower size are instead more likely to be competing “at the margin” in 
niche markets, and thus are more affected by deepening trade integration with respect 
to EU members and other relatively wealthy trading partners. Therefore, when 
assessing the impact of international trade on industry dynamics, firms of different 
size seem to fall in distinct strategic arenas, where they face foreign competition of a 
different nature. This has important implications for strategic planning at the firm 
level, as the identification of competitive threats is a crucial step for any decision 
making managerial process. Our findings suggest that especially large firms have to 
be pro-active in identifying and reacting to the sources of competition from 
developing countries, where producers can compete on a high scale by benefiting 
from lower labor costs and more flexible business regulations. For this purpose, re-
locating part of the production chain abroad and/or out-sourcing intermediate inputs 
from foreign low-cost producers have been shown to be effective strategies for 
improving the survival perspectives of manufacturing firms in Europe (Coucke and 
Sleuwaegen, forthcoming). The relevant competitors for small European firms seem 
instead to be more localised in relatively wealthy partner countries, in particular 
within the EU. This finding is in line with the fact that small enterprises typically 
adopt a more regional strategic focus, aimed at defending and developing their 
specific market niches. Indeed, our empirical results show that small firms tend to 
display lower exit rates when intra-industry trade is increasing, thus pointing to a 
positive role for product differentiation in raising their survival probabilities. 
Finally, our findings also provide important insights for policy makers 
concerned about the drawbacks of globalisation on domestic producers in developed 
countries. In particular, starting from the established fact that increasing import 
competition determines higher death rates of domestic firms in the short-run, our 
contribution provides a deeper understanding of the underlying adjustment dynamics. 
Indeed, we have showed that not all the import flows affect all firms to the same 
extent. While large firms are sensitive to foreign competition from China and other 
low-wage countries, small enterprises in the same industries appear to be more 
affected by increasing import pressure from wealthy countries. These insights are 
extremely important from the policy point of view. In fact, they provide useful 
elements for tailoring public policies to the real needs of heterogeneous firms, in such 
a way that the adjustment to globalisation is accommodated efficiently.  
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In particular, our analysis reveals that small firms might play a crucial role for 
economic growth and job creation in times of globalisation, thanks to their flexibility 
and the ability to develop specific niches on the internationalising markets. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have analysed the relative competitive position of small and 
larger firms within an industry, following increasing import competition on the 
domestic market. This has been done by studying the displacement of domestic firms 
by competitive imports within the framework of an oligopolistic rivalry model, 
characterised by Cournot competition between domestic and foreign firms. The 
displacement effect is found to be stronger for large output flexible firms, while small 
cost flexible ones are less sensitive to increasing import pressure. In turn, large firms 
face lower probabilities of survival, as they become unable to cover their high level of 
fixed costs and do the necessary capital investments. Moreover, when allowing for 
product heterogeneity between domestic and foreign producers, we also find that 
product differentiation reduces the import displacement effect. 
The theoretical propositions are supported by the analysis of firm exit 
dynamics in Europe between 1997 and 2003, in response to the shock of soaring 
import competition from China and other low-wage countries. Indeed, only the exit of 
large firms is found to be sensitive to the latter source of import penetration, while 
small firms are only affected by marginal trade integration with respect to 
neighbouring EU partners and other relatively wealthy countries. Moreover, 
increasing intra-industry trade, pointing to growing product differentiation with 
respect to foreign competitors, is associated to lower exit, but only for small firms. 
Our findings, both at the theoretical and empirical level, corroborate the established 
view that increasing import competition raises the exit rates of domestic firms in the 
short-run. 
However, we add to the previous literature by providing deeper insights about 
the underlying adjustment process. Indeed we show, for the first time, that firms of 
different size are affected differently by diverse sources of import competition. 
Therefore firm size emerges as an important dimension of heterogeneity, which needs 
to be taken into account when studying the effects of trade on industry dynamics. Our 
results have important implications for public policy making.  
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In fact small and larger firms seem to be competing in separate strategic 
groups, where they face different types of international competition. This provides 
useful insights for tailoring public policies to the specific needs of heterogeneous 
firms, in view of effectively accommodating the adjustment process of industries and 
countries to globalisation. Moreover, small firms are shown to play an important role 
within industries facing throat-cutting competition from low-wage countries, thanks to 
their flexibility and the ability to develop successful market niches. 
Further research efforts, employing suitable data, should explore these issues 
deeper. In particular, it would be interesting to assess to what extent our empirical 
results are specific to the European Union case, in which a pervasive economic 
integration process has been shaping the competitive environment already since the 
sixties. The role of country-specific labour and product market institutions in this 
context should also be analysed. Moreover, deeper insights on the adjustment 
dynamics could also be obtained through case-studies, by focusing on firm-level 
managerial choices. 
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NOTES 
1 NACE (Rev 1.1) is the European classification of economic activities, 
corresponding to ISIC (Rev 3.1). 
2 Two sectors have been excluded from the analysis: “manufacturing of coke, 
refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels” (DF) and “manufacturing n.e.c.” 
(DN). In the first case, the choice is due to the peculiar nature of the industry, 
whose dynamics are essentially driven by legal changes and natural factors, 
rather than trade. The other industry constitutes a “catch-all” residual category 
for relatively heterogeneous activities (from the manufacturing of furniture to 
recycling), which would raise problems when trying to relate sectoral firm exit 
to the evolution of import competition. 
3 More details can be found on the Eurostat metadata documents: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
4 Domestic production data are retrieved from the Eurostat Structural Business 
Statistics Database. 
5 Further information is available on the EU Klems website: 
http://www.euklems.net/index.html 
6 Detailed information on the methodology and employed variables is 
available in the document "EU KLEMS growth and productivity accounts 
(Version 1.0). Part I Methodology". 
7 The bias is always smaller than 1%, even with only two observations. 
8 See also Kee et al. (2007). 
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ANNEX: COMPARATIVE STATICS 
Homogeneous products 
The first order conditions of the profit maximization problem outlined in equations 2 
and 3 are as follows: 
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In matrix notation: 
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Substituting the derivatives from equations 1A and 2A we obtain: 
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Applying Cramer’s rule we get: 
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The foreign firm increases its output level following a reduction in τ . The gain in 
output is lower for decreasing levels of output flexibility of the domestic firm. 
In order to compute the variation in profits, we first focus on the price effect: 
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Plugging in the results from equations 7A and 8A, we get: 
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and, in reduced form: 
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From equation 11A we can see that trade liberalization (lower τ ) has the expected 
precompetitive effect in terms of lower prices. 
We now focus on the variation in profits, starting with the domestic firm: 
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Plugging in previous results, we get: 
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For the foreign firm we have: 
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The foreign firm enjoys an increase in profits from a reduction in τ  . The profit gain 
is directly proportional to 
τ∂
∂ fq
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Differentiated products 
The same comparative statics analysis is repeated allowing for product heterogeneity. 
In this case, the profit maximization problem is as follows: 
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The first order conditions are: 
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By total differentiation we get the following linear system: 
 
 










∂
∂
−−−
−−
2
2 )(2
2
d
dd
q
qCβϑβ
ϑββ












∂
∂
∂
∂
τ
τ
d
f
q
q
= 





0
1
    (22A) 
 
 
Applying Cramer’s rule we obtain: 
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In order to study the variation in profits, we start by deriving the price effect for the 
domestic and the foreign firm, respectively. 
 
Domestic firm: 
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Plugging in the results from equations 23A and 24A, we get: 
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and finally: 
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A decrease in τ  has a negative effect on the price of the domestic firm’s product. The 
magnitude of the effect is inversely related to the degree of product differentiation. If 
1=ϑ we are back in the simple case of product homogeneity, while as 0→ϑ  the 
effect approaches zero. 
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Foreign firm: 
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A decrease in τ  has a negative effect also on the price of the foreign firm’s product. 
Finally, the variations in profits for both firms are computed. 
For the domestic firm, by plugging the new results in equation 13A we get: 
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For the foreign firm, going back to equation 16A, we get: 
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Following a decrease in τ , the foreign firm increases its profits. The effect is smaller 
for increasing levels of product differentiation. 
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FIGURE 1 
Variation in import competition: 1995-2003 
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TABLE 1 
Nace (revision 1.1) manufacturing sub-sections 
 
 
DA Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
  
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 
 
DB Manufacture of textiles and textile products 
 
17 Manufacture of textiles 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
 
DC 19  Manufacture of leather and leather products 
 
DD 20  Manufacture of wood and wood products 
 
 
DE Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing 
 
 21  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
 22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
 
DF 23  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
 
DG 24  Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 
 
DH 25  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
 
DI 26  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
 
DJ Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 
 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 
28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
 
DK 29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
 
DL Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 
 
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
 
DM Manufacture of transport equipment 
 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
 
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 
 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
37 Recycling 
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TABLE 2 
Exit rates - country averages 
 
Overall figures Small firms (<20 empl) Large firms (≥20 empl)
Country Exit rate Exit rate Exit rate 
Belgium 5.7% 7.0% 1.1%
Denmark 6.2% 7.0% 0.2%
Finland 5.7% 6.3% 0.1%
Italy 5.9% 6.5% 0.3%
Netherlands 6.3% 7.3% 1.4%
Spain 6.1% 7.0% 0.8%
Sweden 4.8% 5.2% 0.5%
UK 9.8% 10.9% 3.9%
Mean 6.3% 7.1% 1.0%
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TABLE 3 
Exit rates - yearly averages 
 
Overall figures Small firms (<20 empl) Large firms (≥20 empl)
year Exit rate Exit rate Exit rate 
1997 6.2% 6.8% 0.4%
1998 6.4% 7.3% 0.9%
1999 6.4% 7.1% 1.2%
2000 6.3% 7.0% 1.0%
2001 6.1% 6.8% 1.1%
2002 6.4% 7.2% 1.2%
2003 6.5% 7.4% 1.3%
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TABLE 4 
Low-wage trading partners 
 
 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Angola 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Central African Rep 
Chad 
China 
Comoros 
Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
India 
Kenya 
Lao PDR 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Maldives 
Mali 
Mauritania 
 
Moldova 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Niger 
Pakistan 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Sao Tome 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sri Lanka 
St. Vincent 
Sudan 
Togo 
Uganda 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
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TABLE 5 
Share of sectoral imports coming from low-wage economies (on average across the eight EU countries in our sample) 
 
 
 
Sector Description Nace code Low-income share 1995 Low-income share 2003
Manufacture of leather and leather products dc 18% 30%
Manufacture of textiles and textile products db 15% 22%
Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment dl 2% 7%
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products di 2% 6%
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products dh 2% 5%
Manufacture of wood and wood products dd 3% 5%
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. dk 1% 4%
Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products dj 2% 4%
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco da 2% 2%
Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres dg 1% 2%
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing de 0% 1%
Manufacture of transport equipment dm 0% 1%
Mean 4% 8%
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TABLE 6 
Econometric Results 
 
Dep. var.: Industry/country specific exit rate, defined over the population of small and large firms 
 
(1)             
Small Firms
(2)            
Large Firms
 ∆ Imp Comp Low (t-1) -0.0447 0.4143***
(0.112) (0.138)
 ∆ Imp Comp High (t-1) 0.1094** 0.0517
(0.046) (0.037)
 ∆ IIT Index -0.0584** 0.0026
(0.024) (0.018)
Entry Rate (t-1) 0.2455*** 0.7227***
(0.048) (0.172)
TFP Growth (t-1) 0.0236 0.06**
(0.029) (0.025)
Investment/Turnover (t-1) 0.0028 -0.0016
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.0662***
(0.007)
industry dummies yes yes
country dummies yes yes
year dummies yes yes
N. of obs. 302 298
R-sq 0.87
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1% 
 
 
